Food initiative
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Contents
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Lead author of this policy brief: Mathilde Despont.
Key points
The initiative seeks to raise net self-sufficiency to at least 70% within ten years while transforming production, consumption and the environmental objectives of Swiss food policy.
The aim is to improve Switzerland's food security and the sustainability of the food produced and consumed in Switzerland.
About the text
The Food Initiative seeks to strengthen Switzerland's food autonomy by raising self-sufficiency to at least 70% within ten years while making agriculture more sustainable. In particular, it proposes prioritising plant production for human consumption, protecting soils, water and biodiversity, and reducing dependence on pesticides and imports. To this end, it uses several public policy levers: measures to promote plant-based foods; compliance, within the same ten-year period, with maximum values for nitrogen and phosphorus losses enshrined in the Constitution; and mechanisms to protect biodiversity, soil fertility and groundwater resources.[i]
Key concepts
Net self-sufficiency
The share of food consumed in Switzerland covered by domestic production, calculated by taking account of the imports required for production itself (seeds, animal feed, fertilisers). This is a stricter indicator than the gross self-sufficiency rate: currently at 46%, the initiative aims to raise it to 70% net.
Agricultural Policy 2030+ (AP2030+)
A legislative proposal that the Federal Council plans to put out for consultation to develop agricultural policy without amending the Constitution. This is the alternative the government puts forward in response to the initiative.
Direct payments
Subsidies paid to farmers subject to certain farming practices. They are central to the debate because, according to the initiative committee, 75% of current subsidies support animal production, a point of contention similar to that surrounding the 2021 drinking water initiative.
Food security versus food sovereignty
Food security means guaranteed access to sufficient food, including through imports. Food sovereignty (or autonomy), which is closer to the initiative's aim, emphasises a country's capacity to feed itself through its own production, independently of external markets.
Environmental objectives for agriculture (EOA)
Target values set by the Confederation to limit nitrogen and phosphorus losses to the environment; the initiative seeks to make them binding within ten years.
Cross-border shopping
The practice of buying food abroad (often at lower prices), a side effect feared by the No campaign if domestic prices rise.
Origins of the proposal
The Food Initiative was launched on 16 August 2024. The popular vote will take place on 27 September 2026. The initiative grew out of the “Clean Water for All” movement associated with Franziska Herren and is supported mainly by advocates of sustainable agriculture, environmental protection and water resources, rather than by the major political parties.
Indeed, no party officially supports the initiative. The SP considers it unrealistic and recommends voting NO. The Greens, who also consider it unrealistic, take a nuanced position: “we share the initiative's objective, but not necessarily the proposed means”, hence their recommendation to allow a free vote. The GLP opposes it, as does the political right, which considers the targets unrealistic, while the SVP denounces a “vegan diktat”. The initiative likewise finds no support among business associations and umbrella organisations.[ii],[iii],[iv],[v]
In its dispatch, the Federal Council recommends rejecting the initiative, considering its objectives too ambitious for the allotted ten years: raising the self-sufficiency rate from 46% to 70% would require a drastic reduction in meat production and consumption, extensive state intervention and new investments that could not be recouped within that period, with a risk of shifting the environmental impact abroad through increased imports. It also regards the inclusion of such detailed objectives in the Constitution as legally inappropriate and unnecessary, and proposes instead to address food security and the reduction of the ecological footprint through the development of agricultural policy from 2030 onwards.[vi] Parliament followed this line without disputing the initiative's environmental objectives[vii], but challenged the means chosen to achieve them. In the National Council, the left and the GLP attempted to advance a direct counterproposal focused on protecting ecosystems, biodiversity, water and soil fertility, but failed to obtain a majority. All parliamentary groups then opposed the initiative itself, which was rejected without a formal vote on 17 December 2025. The Council of States followed the same course in March 2026: its committee recommended rejection, followed by rejection without a formal vote in plenary on 17 March. Federal Councillor Guy Parmelin defended consumers' freedom before the chambers to decide for themselves whether to increase the plant-based share of their diet, rather than having this imposed through the Constitution.[viii],[ix],[x]
The earlier “For clean drinking water” initiative, launched by Herren in 2017, was rejected in the popular vote on 13 June 2021 by 60.7% of voters, but had the support of several parties[xi]: the Greens, the SP, the Green Liberals and the EVP, alongside the initiative committee and environmental organisations. They faced opposition from the Federal Council, Parliament, the Swiss Farmers' Union, Bio Suisse, economiesuisse, the SVP, the FDP and the Centre, which feared a decline in Swiss production, increased imports and the displacement of pollution abroad. Although it pursued the same broad ambition as the 2026 initiative (more sustainable agriculture that better protects water, biodiversity and food), the 2021 initiative imposed more radical direct constraints by making direct payments conditional on abandoning pesticides altogether and certain uses of antibiotics. By contrast, the 2026 initiative takes a broader, more systemic approach (subsidies, production, consumption, resources and a quantified target of 70% net self-sufficiency within ten years) without imposing such a direct break with farming practices. It is therefore notable that the 2021 initiative, despite its more radical instruments, secured the support of four parties while no party supports the 2026 initiative.[xii],[xiii]
That experience has probably made parties favourable to environmental issues more cautious.[xiv],[xv] More generally, there is an interesting paradox: climate and environmental issues regularly reach a popular vote, but constitutional initiatives seen as ambitious or restrictive are generally rejected. “Ambitious and costly” climate policies are set aside in favour of a “policy of small steps” capable of assembling a broader coalition.[xvi] From this perspective, acceptance of the Food Initiative would be a particularly notable exception to this pattern.[xvii]
Summary of the main issues at stake in the vote
The main issues at stake in this vote are as follows:
1. Food security versus feasibility
There is consensus on the underlying issue of reducing Switzerland's dependence on food imports. The disagreement concerns the method: is achieving 70% self-sufficiency within ten years realistic, or is this numerical target unattainable without fundamentally changing production and consumption?
2. Consumers' freedom of choice
The No campaign points to the risk of a diet imposed by the state (less meat, more plant-based food), as opposed to consumers' right to choose freely what they eat.
3. The future of livestock farming and Swiss agriculture
According to the Federal Council, the target would require nearly halving the pig and poultry populations. This is therefore a direct issue for farmers, between those who see an opportunity to increase the value of plant production and those who fear a loss of income and land.
4. Prices and purchasing power
The No campaign expects domestic food to become more expensive and cross-border shopping to increase as a result of restricted supply.
5. Protection of water, soils and biodiversity
An environmental issue on which there is agreement in principle (groundwater pollution, soil fertility), but disagreement about the urgency and the tools needed to address it.
6. Constitution versus ordinary legislation
An institutional question: should a quantified, binding target be written into the Constitution, or would it be better to pursue this development through legislation (the future Agricultural Policy 2030+), which is more flexible but offers no guarantee of results?
7. Foreign trade
Risks cited by the Federal Council concerning international agreements (WTO), and a possible unintended effect: increased meat imports if Swiss production falls without demand declining at the same pace.
Changes introduced by the text
Current situation
Switzerland's net self-sufficiency rate is currently 46%. Around 60 to 70% of Swiss agricultural land is suitable only for grassland (which can be used for livestock farming). Seventy-five per cent of agricultural subsidies (CHF 3.6 billion) support animal production. Groundwater is also affected by pesticides and nitrates, and drinking-water catchments sometimes have to be closed.
Changes sought by the initiative
Raise the net self-sufficiency rate to at least 70% within ten years
Reorient agriculture and the food industry towards the production and consumption of plant-based foods
Reduce food waste
Guarantee access to clean drinking water through national water planning
Comply with the maximum values set for nitrogen and phosphorus losses within ten years
Preserve biodiversity and soil fertility as foundations of agricultural production
Changes that would take effect in practice
According to the Federal Council, the numerical target could be achieved only through major state interventions: nearly halving the pig and poultry populations, reducing the production of bread-making cereals, and imposing rather than freely choosing a change in consumption habits. The No campaign also expects domestic food to become more expensive and purchases to shift abroad. Conversely, if consumption does not fall in line with Swiss animal production, an unintended effect is possible: increased meat imports, shifting pollution from livestock farming outside Switzerland instead of reducing it.
Areas that the vote will affect
1. Agriculture — livestock farming
An expected reduction in livestock numbers, especially pigs and poultry; a decline in cattle, sheep and goat farming in grassland areas.
2. Agriculture — plant production
A shift in crops towards direct human consumption (less fodder); however, according to the No campaign, plant yields would fall despite this shift, owing to a shortage of fertiliser and animals to fertilise soils naturally.
3. Mountain and alpine agriculture
Risk of livestock farming disappearing in areas where only grazing is possible, leading to scrub encroachment and a decline in agricultural use in those regions.
4. Landscape and biodiversity
Loss of cultivated landscapes maintained by extensive livestock farming; an ambiguous effect on biodiversity (positive if fewer pesticides and fertilisers are used; negative if alpine pastures become overgrown).
5. Water protection
Reduction in nitrogen and phosphorus losses, protection of groundwater from pesticides and nitrates, and national water planning.
6. Soils
Preservation of soil fertility, with emphasis on practices such as mixed cropping, agroforestry and regenerative agriculture.
7. Subsidies and agricultural policy
Redirecting direct payments (75% currently allocated to animal production) towards plant production.
8. Food processing industry
New processing capacity for plant-based foods to be created (according to supporters); higher costs and a loss of competitiveness (according to opponents).
9. Consumers — prices
Domestic foods, both animal and plant-based, are expected to become more expensive.
10. Consumers — freedom of choice
Reduced freedom to choose one's diet owing to a restricted supply of animal products.
11. Employment
Accelerated structural change in agriculture and the food industry, with job losses anticipated by the No campaign.
12. Foreign trade / imports
A targeted reduction in food imports (around 20% according to Guy Parmelin), considered very difficult to achieve; a risk of production shifting abroad (meat imports) if consumption does not fall at the same pace.
13. Cross-border shopping
Risk that food purchases shift to neighbouring countries if Swiss prices rise.
14. International trade relations (WTO)
Risks cited concerning international trade agreements if Switzerland restricts its imports.
15. Constitutional law
The question of whether quantified, detailed targets belong in the Constitution rather than in legislation.
16. Public finances
Potentially high costs for the Confederation's budget, particularly through financial assistance needed to support a transition considered socially difficult to absorb within the allotted time.
Campaign arguments
Summary of the main arguments
TOPIC | YES CAMPAIGN | NO CAMPAIGN |
Food security | Switzerland depends on other countries for approximately 50% of its food; a risk in the event of war or extreme weather events | The initiative's title is misleading: it would not guarantee food security but would impose a ‘vegan diktat’ |
Land use | 60% of arable land is used to produce fodder rather than plant-based food for people | 70% of agricultural land is suitable only for grassland, usable solely through livestock farming; the initiative would instead weaken the potential for plant production (vegetables, fruit, cereals, rapeseed) by imposing conditions considered absurd |
Livestock farming / livestock numbers | Shifting production towards plant-based foods would strengthen food security | A drastic reduction in livestock numbers would be needed to meet the target, directly affecting farm incomes |
Drinking water | Resources threatened by pesticides, nitrates and climate change; the initiative provides for national water planning | An issue considered already addressed by measures under way at all levels (particularly nutrient policy) |
Soils and biodiversity | Intensive use of pesticides and fertilisers destroys soil fertility and biodiversity | Not disputed in principle, but considered redundant in view of reforms already under way |
Agricultural subsidies | 75% of current subsidies support animal production at the expense of plant production | Not addressed directly in the campaign's arguments |
Consumers | Would encourage a healthier and more sustainable diet | Restriction of freedom of food choice imposed by the state |
Prices | More local production and processing would create jobs and added value in Switzerland | Domestic foods, both animal and plant-based, would become more expensive because of restricted supply |
Trade | Not addressed by the initiative committee | Increase in cross-border shopping |
Political precedent | Not addressed | ‘Heavy-handed move’: Franziska Herren had already made a similar demand through the drinking water initiative in 2018, rejected by more than 60% in 2021 |
Legal framework / necessity | A binding target in the Constitution is necessary to guarantee tangible results | Initiative considered unnecessary: numerous measures are already under way at all levels to improve the sustainability of agriculture and the food chain, without any need to amend the Constitution |
Campaign tone | Frames the initiative as a matter of security and sustainability | Reframes it as a ‘vegan food initiative’, arguing that the official title is misleading |
Political supporters | Initiative committee, organic/regenerative farmers, groundwater experts, physicians, environmental associations | Federal Council, SP, GLP, FDP, Centre, EVP (the SVP also leans towards No), Swiss Farmers' Union, food industry, GastroSuisse, HotellerieSuisse, Swiss Tourism Federation |
Arguments used by the “YES” campaign
Switzerland depends on other countries for approximately 50% of its food; a risk in the event of war or extreme weather events[xviii]
Confirmation rating: 4 — Mostly true.
Dependence on imports is real and documented, and the risks associated with conflicts and extreme weather events are plausible in light of the global literature. However, the exact figure of approximately 50% is not confirmed (the self-sufficiency rate instead suggests approximately 31%), and Switzerland's vulnerability is mitigated by the geographic diversification of its import sources.
Strength of evidence: 3 — Some research, some relevant information.
A study specific to Switzerland (Ritzel et al., 2024) provides direct quantitative data, supplemented by a global body of work on food vulnerabilities linked to conflict and climate. The lack of studies specifically assessing a “war or extreme weather event” scenario for Switzerland limits the strength of the assessment.
60% of arable land is used to produce fodder rather than plant-based food for people[xix]
Confirmation rating: 4 — Mostly true.
The competition for arable land between fodder and food crops is confirmed by Swiss research, although the precise figure of 60% slightly overstates the share of arable land in the strict sense (rather about 43%), while potentially understating the share if all agricultural land is included (about 74%).
Strength of evidence: 5 — Extensively documented claim.
Several high-quality Swiss studies (Keller et al. 2024, Ineichen et al. 2023, Jaisli et al. 2024, Frehner et al. 2019/2021) precisely quantify the use of arable land for fodder and model remedial scenarios, supported by a robust global body of research on food-feed competition.
Shifting production towards plant-based foods would strengthen food security[xx]
Confirmation rating: 5 — True by consensus.
The scientific literature overwhelmingly agrees that shifting production towards plant-based foods increases the overall availability of calories and protein while reducing environmental pressure, although this consensus rests mainly on global models and national studies (United States, EU) rather than data specific to Switzerland.
Strength of evidence: 5 — Extensively documented claim.
Numerous high-quality studies quantify efficiency gains (Shepon et al. 2018, Schiavo et al. 2023, Yang et al. 2024) and environmental benefits (Wijerathna-Yapa et al. 2022, Kakabouki et al. 2025), while clearly identifying climate, nutritional and socioeconomic limitations requiring diversification and planning.
Resources threatened by pesticides, nitrates and climate change; the initiative provides for national water planning[xxi]
Confirmation rating: 5 — True by consensus.
The scientific consensus is clear and extensively documented: Swiss water resources are degraded by pesticides and nitrates; climate change exacerbates this pollution; and integrated planning at national or river-basin level is needed to manage these threats holistically.
Strength of evidence: 5 — Extensively documented claim.
Numerous modelling and field studies (Covatti et al. 2025, Zarrineh et al. 2019, Dueri and Mack 2024, Fabre et al. 2023, Gerecke et al. 2002) quantify interactions between climate, farming practices and water quality in Switzerland, and converge in advocating integrated management approaches.
Intensive use of pesticides and fertilisers destroys soil fertility and biodiversity[xxii]
Confirmation rating: 5 — True by consensus.
The scientific consensus, strongly supported by Swiss monitoring data and European meta-analyses, confirms that intensive use of fertilisers and pesticides destroys soil fertility and biodiversity.
Strength of evidence: 5 — Extensively documented claim.
Swiss studies (Bucheli et al. 2023, Steiner et al. 2024, Yang et al. 2021, Jarosch et al. 2026) and major European syntheses (Köninger et al. 2026, Beaumelle et al. 2023) precisely quantify the mechanisms of degradation and the impacts on soil fauna.
75% of current subsidies support animal production at the expense of plant production[xxiii]
Confirmation rating: 4 — Mostly true.
The argument is correct in its overall direction and supported by Swiss-specific data, although the precise figure of 75% slightly understates the bias, which research places above 80%.
Strength of evidence: 5 — Extensively documented claim.
Several high-quality Swiss studies (Schläpfer et al. 2023/2025, Huber et al. 2023, El Benni et al. 2024) and European models (Kortleve et al. 2024, Springmann et al. 2022) quantify the structural bias of subsidies towards animal production and its environmental effects.
The initiative text would encourage a healthier and more sustainable diet[xxiv]
Confirmation rating: 4 — Mostly true.
The scientific consensus confirms that integrated policies encourage healthier, more sustainable diets, but emphasises that voluntary and informational measures are insufficient without binding regulations.
Strength of evidence: 5 — Extensively documented claim.
Numerous meta-analyses and systematic reviews (Burgaz et al. 2023, Herrero et al. 2020, Béné et al. 2018, Anderson et al. 2019) quantify the effectiveness of policy instruments and identify the conditions for success.
More local production and processing would create jobs and added value in Switzerland[xxv]
Confirmation rating: 4 — Mostly true.
Research confirms that local production and processing create jobs and added value in Switzerland, especially in mountain regions, but notes that the scale of these effects depends heavily on coordination between stakeholders and the infrastructure available.
Strength of evidence: 4 — Moderately documented claim.
Swiss case studies (Valposchiavo, Valais, dairy cooperatives) and international systematic reviews converge on positive effects, although added-value multipliers are less consistent than employment multipliers.
A binding target in the Constitution is necessary to guarantee tangible results[xxvi]
Confirmation rating: 2 — Mostly false.
No, a constitutional target is not sufficient to guarantee tangible results. For Switzerland, research suggests that constitutional anchoring provides a strong political basis but does not, on its own, guarantee measurable effects. The research points more consistently to the need for policy packages, coherent instruments and measures on the consumption side than to the idea that a binding target alone would produce results. No, a constitutional target is not necessary to achieve tangible results.
Research clearly distinguishes useful from necessary. A constitutional target can strengthen legitimacy, set the agenda and impose a political duty to act, but studies do not show that it is an indispensable condition for tangible results.
Strength of evidence: 4 — A useful body of research and information.
Research supports the view that enshrining a target in the Constitution can help guide action, but does not support the claim that it is necessary or that it alone guarantees tangible results. In Switzerland, the emerging consensus is rather that a constitutional target without coherent instruments, explicit trade-offs and robust implementation remains insufficient.
Arguments used by the “NO” campaign
The initiative's title is misleading: it would not guarantee food security but would impose a “vegan diktat”[xxvii]
Confirmation rating: 2 — Mostly false.
Strength of evidence: 5 — Extensively documented claim.
The literature supports the view that Switzerland would probably need to move towards a much more plant-based dietto meet food sustainability objectives, but it does not support the claim that everyone would have to become more or less vegan.
70% of agricultural land is suitable only for grassland, usable solely through livestock farming; the initiative would instead weaken the potential for plant production (vegetables, fruit, cereals, rapeseed) by imposing conditions considered absurd[xxviii]
Confirmation rating: 3 — It depends.
Strength of evidence: 4 — A useful body of research and information.
The consensus supports the premise that Switzerland has extensive grassland and that not all of it can be cultivated. It does not support the stronger conclusion that the initiative would necessarily weaken plant production; the literature instead suggests that everything depends on which constraints are imposed and where, and whether they shift livestock farming onto genuinely marginal land while freeing good arable land for human food.
The initiative would lead to a drastic reduction in livestock numbers to meet its target, directly affecting farm incomes[xxix]
Yes, a decline in livestock numbers is likely, but there is no consensus on the word “drastic”. The literature provided supports the view that achieving ambitious agri-environmental objectives often involves reducing animal production and sometimes herd sizes, with direct effects on the incomes of some livestock farms. On the other hand, it does not clearly support a drastic, uniform reduction, and the economic effects vary greatly with specialisation, prices and public compensation.
Confirmation rating: 4 — Mostly true.
Strength of evidence: 4 — A useful body of research and information.
The core of the argument is therefore mostly true: food sustainability targets can reduce livestock numbers and directly affect farm incomes. However, “drastic” goes beyond what the consensus best supported by this literature establishes.
An issue considered already addressed by measures under way at all levels (particularly nutrient policy)[xxx]
No, existing policies are considered insufficient to achieve food sustainability objectives.
Confirmation rating: 2 — Mostly false.
Strength of evidence: 5 — Extensively documented claim/information.
The argument that ongoing measures already address the issue adequately is mostly false. The literature shows that existing policies, particularly those targeting nutrients, provide a basis but remain largely inadequate and fragmented, and cannot achieve sustainability objectives without major structural changes.
Restriction of freedom of food choice imposed by the state[xxxi]
Yes, the initiative would partially restrict choice, but not in the sense of imposing a diet.
In the literature, food policies that act on supply, prices, marketing or food environments reduce some available options, but do not necessarily eliminate individual autonomy. The consensus concerns a gradual restriction of choice depending on how intrusive the instruments are, rather than a simple opposition between complete freedom and complete coercion.
Confirmation rating: 4 — Mostly true.
Strength of evidence: 4 — A useful body of research and information.
If the initiative were accepted, the claim that it would restrict some freedom of food choice is broadly supported. By contrast, research does not strongly support the notion of a diet wholly imposed by the state; it describes instead a reorganisation of supply and incentives, with a partial restriction of choice that varies with the instruments selected.
Domestic foods, both animal and plant-based, would become more expensive because of restricted supply[xxxii]
Yes, supply restrictions raise prices, but the scale varies greatly by product. Restrictions on movement and supply increase food prices, with stronger effects on meat, fish and vegetables than on dairy products or cereals. Switzerland is already an “island of high prices”, where customs protection keeps food prices 66% above the European average. Swiss food sovereignty policies structurally entail higher domestic prices.
Confirmation rating: 4 — Mostly true.
Strength of evidence: 4 — A useful body of research and information.
The argument is mostly true: the literature confirms that supply restrictions and sustainability requirements increase domestic food prices, but with important qualifications. The effects are uneven (a large increase for meat, a small one for dairy products), and several mitigating mechanisms exist, including regulatory alignment, trade agreements and less waste.
Increase in cross-border shopping[xxxiii]
Yes, higher Swiss prices would increase cross-border shopping, especially among households near the border. The literature confirms that price differences between Switzerland and its neighbours are the main driver of cross-border shopping, with food being the leading product bought abroad. COVID-19 border closures increased domestic food spending by 10.4% in border areas, showing the scale of normal cross-border substitution. This behaviour is rooted in established routines and does not disappear with temporary shocks.
Confirmation rating: 4 — Mostly true.
Strength of evidence: 4 — A useful body of research and information.
The argument is mostly true: any rise in Swiss food prices resulting from the initiative would mechanically increase incentives to shop abroad, especially for households near the border and those on modest incomes. The literature shows that this phenomenon responds to price differences, but its scale will depend on the perceived quality difference of Swiss products and the distance to the border.
Initiative considered unnecessary: numerous measures are already under way at all levels to improve the sustainability of agriculture and the food chain, without any need to amend the Constitution[xxxiv]
No, the “unnecessary initiative” argument is mostly false in light of the research. Measures already exist at several levels, including private standards, partnerships, public guidelines and sectoral policies. But the literature chiefly agrees that these measures remain fragmented, voluntary or partial and are generally insufficient to transform the food system on the scale required.
Confirmation rating: 2 — Mostly false.
Strength of evidence: 5 — Extensively documented claim.
The argument that the Food Initiative is unnecessary because many measures are already under way is largely contradicted by the research consensus. The literature acknowledges the existence of numerous initiatives but more often considers them too scattered, voluntary or poorly coordinated to achieve a sustainable transformation of the food system on their own, leaving a credible role for reform at a higher level.
Questions put to science
A. Feasibility and self-sufficiency
Is 70% self-sufficiency really achievable in Switzerland?
Yes, but it requires much more radical changes in diet and land management than previous agricultural reforms have managed to bring about.[xxxv] Models show that self-sufficiency can be increased while environmental impacts are reduced, provided the average diet changes drastically: a sharp increase in plant-based foods, a marked decline in meat and alcohol, and less food waste. Replacing some animal protein with locally produced plant protein by growing legumes on land currently used for fodder could increase self-sufficiency while preserving some dairy production. Internationally, several European countries exceed 100% overall self-sufficiency — Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia — but conceal substantial dependence in specific food groups, particularly fruit, vegetables and fish. Slovakia, which set itself a target of 80% by 2020, did not meet it and became deficient even in basic foods. Countries with little agricultural land per person but intensive production maintain partial self-sufficiency, yet remain structurally dependent on imports for several food groups. Finally, current Swiss direct payments for security of supply, which account for over a third of the agricultural budget, barely enable the operational calorie-production targets to be met if policy remains unchanged. This suggests that reaching 70% requires much deeper changes than past reforms.
How could 70% be achieved in practice: what would need to be produced and consumed differently?
In Switzerland, 70% appears achievable, but mainly through a shift towards more plant-based food, fewer monogastric livestock (pigs, poultry, etc.) and less waste.[xxxvi] The research converges on three concrete levers: reallocating some arable land from fodder to crops consumed directly by people, greatly increasing grain legumes, and reducing both meat consumption and production, particularly pork and poultry. Peas, soya and field beans have considerable potential in Switzerland, and a scenario maximising legumes on 181,479 hectares would replace around 41% of the animal protein consumed while retaining some milk and meat. “Feed-no-food” scenarios retain a place for ruminants that use grass, but entail fewer animals overall and an especially pronounced reduction in pigs and poultry. Demand must follow: diets optimised for health in Switzerland increase plant-based calories by 55 to 78% and reduce animal-based calories by 35 to 43%, while the current Swiss diet remains too rich in red meat, dairy and sugar and too low in legumes, nuts, whole grains and vegetables. This transition generally improves self-sufficiency and the climate footprint, especially if accompanied by less food waste and crop planning adapted to local soils and climate. The main qualification is that a healthier diet does not automatically increase self-sufficiency unless Swiss production adapts at the same time, and trade-offs remain concerning yields, water, pesticides and land use.
Can Switzerland produce more while eating less meat?
Yes, producing more in Switzerland while eating less meat appears feasible if some fodder crops and pig and poultry production are replaced by plant crops for human food. Swiss studies converge: reducing meat consumption, especially from systems fed with crops that compete with human food, frees arable land, increases direct plant production and tends to improve self-sufficiency, particularly through more legumes, fewer pigs and poultry, less waste and livestock farming more focused on grass-fed ruminants. This does not happen automatically: the studies highlight trade-offs involving yields, some reliance on imports, the biological link between milk and beef, and the need to align agricultural policy, production and demand so that the shift improves health, the environment and food security together.[xxxvii]
B. Consumption and freedom of choice
Will we have to eat less meat, or even become vegetarian or vegan?
Yes, eating less meat is recommended, but becoming vegetarian or vegan is not necessarily required.[xxxviii]
The literature mainly says this: in Switzerland, the most robust diet is a more plant-based one that follows nutritional recommendations, with less meat and more legumes, nuts, fruit, vegetables and whole grains; it improves health, environmental impacts and often self-sufficiency. Vegetarian and vegan diets reduce emissions further and can improve health, but require more attention to intakes of B12, iodine, calcium, iron and sometimes vitamin D. The most realistic route is therefore not compulsory vegetarianism but less and better meat, together with fewer processed foods, less waste and changes in production.
Will we still be able to eat what we want, including products that cannot be produced in Switzerland?
Yes, you will still be able to eat products that are not produced in Switzerland.[xxxix]
The literature does not describe a ban on imported foods but a rebalancing of local production, imports and resilience: Switzerland is structurally dependent on imports for products it cannot produce, such as coffee and certain exotic fruits. Its food imports come largely from neighbouring countries with relatively low vulnerability overall, with no clear increase in vulnerability between 2014 and 2019. The scientific debate treats self-sufficiency as a continuum rather than a binary choice between autarky and completely free trade. At the same time, several studies show that some external dependence can be reduced mainly by changing the Swiss food system — less imported animal feed, more legumes, less waste, and a joint adjustment of production and diets. This does not eliminate the need to import some products or the trade-offs, since healthier diets can even increase certain import dependencies.
C. Farmers
Could the initiative place further pressure on farmers who are already struggling?
Yes. Without support, it could increase the pressure on some farmers.[xl]
The main risk is not the sustainability objective itself, but a poorly designed transition: many farms already operate with fragile profitability, face a strong squeeze between costs and prices, and abrupt changes in the rules can weaken their resilience, especially in peripheral areas. Policies that reduce inputs tend to lower farmers' output and competitiveness, with a risk of falling incomes and rising food prices. This risk is heightened by very concrete constraints: transition costs, a need for more labour, limited access to credit, regulatory overload, public support that is often too general or bureaucratic, and too little consideration of smallholders. The literature also says that a transition can be fairer when accompanied by targeted assistance, access to finance, credible technical advice, remunerative markets and policies adapted to local circumstances rather than uniform measures.
Can livestock farmers really change their activities, particularly in areas where the land is mainly suitable for livestock?
A change of activity among Swiss livestock farmers is possible, but will remain limited and uneven if the initiative is accepted.[xli] In regions where the land is mainly suitable for livestock, a large-scale exit from livestock farming seems unrealistic in the short term: some forms of production remain attractively profitable, many farmers are locked in by past investments, skills, networks and professional identity, and studies show that transitions away from livestock do occur but are currently rare and mostly found in niches or among some intensive livestock farms able to move into market gardening or other activities. For this to work, multi-year transition assistance, credible technical advice, better access to credit, reliable markets, local non-farm jobs, cooperation and new value chains will be needed, above all with solutions differentiated by region. In grassland and mountain areas, the most realistic course is often a move towards more agroecological and diversified livestock systems rather than a complete change of activity; diversification succeeds more often where there is social capital, infrastructure, labour markets and farmers' ability to envisage a different future.
D. Prices and economic effects
Would the initiative raise food prices and, if so, who would bear the cost?[xlii]
Yes, food prices would rise, especially for animal products and some processed products.
The exact scale would depend on the measures chosen, but the literature shows that when environmental costs are internalised or agricultural production becomes more expensive, price increases first affect meat and dairy products, which carry the highest external costs. Taxed processed foods may also rise substantially, with observed increases averaging around 4.8% and reaching 8% or more for confectionery, biscuits and packaged pastries. Certified or more “sustainable” products often cost consumers more, and affluent consumers are more willing to pay that premium. Low-income households would bear the greatest burden because they spend a larger share of income on food and find any price rise harder to absorb. Producers do not necessarily receive the additional amount, part of which may be absorbed or captured by processors, retailers or other intermediaries. To avoid a regressive effect in Switzerland, targeted subsidies or income support would be needed, since lower fruit and vegetable prices do increase purchases.
Could it encourage cross-border shopping and simply shift some of the environmental impact abroad?
Yes, cross-border shopping and the displacement of impacts abroad are real risks, but are not automatic.
If Switzerland unilaterally makes certain foods more expensive, some purchases may shift abroad and some production or environmental impacts may also leak through trade, because national policies sometimes move production to less regulated countries. This risk is credible in the Switzerland–EU area: agricultural transition scenarios for the EU, the United Kingdom and Switzerland show that a fall in domestic emissions can be accompanied by 48% [xliii]carbon leakage. More broadly, European food demand already externalises much of its impact, with around 50% of food-related CO2 and 46% of the land footprint outside the EU; the UK case shows that 64% of emissions and 70% of land used for food may be abroad. That said, leakage does not always occur in the same way: a Danish meat tax did not lead to a detectable rise in meat exports, suggesting that the “tax it here, sell it elsewhere” channel is not inevitable. Some supply-chain measures can limit displacement: zero-deforestation requirements reduce net deforestation despite substantial internal leakage, while cross-border leakage remains below 3%. Finally, carbon border adjustments could reduce some imported emissions — by around 25% in a UK–EU simulation — but address only a limited share of the problem globally.
E. Environment
Can self-sufficiency really be increased while reducing agriculture's environmental impact?
Yes, increasing self-sufficiency while reducing environmental impact appears possible, but only with major changes in production and diets.[xliv]
In Switzerland, a diet consistent with recommendations, with more plant-based food and less meat, would increase self-sufficiency while nearly halving environmental impact, and could cut it by as much as 75% with less waste. European and Swedish scenarios point in the same direction: more circular or agroecological systems can feed the population while substantially reducing land use, emissions or nitrogen losses, but also require fewer animal products and a reorganisation of crop and livestock systems. By contrast, pursuing self-sufficiency without these levers often creates trade-offs: in China, increasing self-sufficiency alone raises land and fertiliser use, and in Baden-Württemberg maximising production improves self-sufficiency but fails to meet environmental objectives. The findings therefore converge on a simple condition: the target is credible if it combines fewer animal products, less waste, agronomic innovation and better circularity; it is much less credible if the sole aim is to produce more locally.
Are the initiative's various objectives — self-sufficiency, climate, biodiversity, soil and water protection — compatible with one another?
Yes, but only with compromises and systemic changes.[xlv]
In Switzerland, both self-sufficiency and several environmental indicators can improve if more plant-based diets, less waste and changes in production are combined. Scenarios that reduce meat consumption and competition between animal feed and human food also improve climate, nitrogen, water and biodiversity outcomes while potentially maintaining the food supply. In Switzerland, shifting some land used for fodder to legumes points in the same direction, reducing dependence on imported animal feed and nitrogen pollution. But these objectives cannot all be maximised at once: soils often perform well in two or three functions, but less often in biodiversity, climate and nutrient cycling simultaneously. In Switzerland, increasing production or acting on just one lever tends to recreate trade-offs, either through greater domestic impacts or through more imports and thus impacts shifted abroad. Climate or water-protection measures can also conflict with food prices, irrigation or some ecosystem services if they are not coordinated. In short, the initiative's objectives are compatible under certain conditions, but not through extensification alone or a simple production increase; Swiss studies converge on an integrated policy addressing production, diets and waste together.
F. Implementation
Is the transition feasible within the time allowed by the initiative?
Yes, a transition appears feasible in ten years, but mainly as the start of a sustained trajectory rather than a fully completed transformation.[xlvi]
Ten years is enough to initiate a substantial food-system transformation in Switzerland if it is divided into concrete stages, monitored through rigorous indicators, driven by coherent packages of measures and supported by the state at several levels. But the literature also agrees that a complete transformation is difficult in that time: food transitions are complex and politically contentious, slowed by established interests, inconsistent policies, fragmentation between production and consumption in Switzerland, and very concrete obstacles concerning finance, organisation, skills and stakeholder support. In practice, the ten-year period is therefore credible for achieving visible, lasting results — particularly through measures already enjoying the greatest acceptance in Switzerland, such as research, education, information, certain standards and participatory coordination — but not for resolving every trade-off or completing a wholesale redesign of the food system.
G. Food security and necessity
Does Switzerland really face a security-of-supply problem that justifies increasing its self-sufficiency?
Yes, supply vulnerability exists, but increasing self-sufficiency is justified only in a targeted way.[xlvii]
Switzerland does not have a food-security problem in the sense of a current shortage: supply is considered sufficient, production covers around 60–70% of net consumption, and strategic reserves provide protection against import disruptions. It does, however, face structural vulnerability to external shocks, since supply-chain disruptions, geopolitical crises, climate and diseases raise risks for countries with low self-sufficiency, even if Switzerland mitigates these through imports mainly from neighbouring countries that are relatively stable overall. The literature therefore suggests that strengthening some domestic capacities is rational, especially where dependence is high or poorly diversified, but not pursuing autarky: trade remains a pillar of resilience, and self-sufficiency works better as a continuum than as a binary target. Above all, Swiss research suggests that the most effective lever is not more general agricultural protection, which is often inefficient, but a targeted increase in self-sufficiency through fewer fodder imports, more legumes, more plant-based diets and less waste, improving both resilience and sustainability.
Is the initiative really necessary: what would it make possible that current agricultural and environmental policy does not already allow?
Yes, the initiative is mainly needed to require what the current framework already permits without mandating.
Switzerland already has an extensive legal basis and set of instruments — ecological requirements attached to direct payments, binding rules for water, soils and air, biodiversity payments and even trials of results-based payments — so the initiative would not create a new toolkit. Its relevance is that the current system fails to meet its own objectives: only seven of the 30 measurable environmental objectives had been met, and several studies conclude that environmental targets continue to be missed despite repeated reforms. The initiative would therefore primarily tighten conditions and force greater coherence between production, the environment, climate, trade and consumption, while Swiss policy remains largely sectoral, individualised and fragmented. But it would not eliminate trade-offs: stricter rules could improve some indicators and biodiversity on ordinary farmland while reducing production, increasing imports, shifting impacts abroad and prompting some farms to withdraw or fail to comply. In short, the initiative is not necessary to authorise public action, but to make it politically harder to avoid in a system where rejected initiatives often secure compromises without changing the trajectory quickly enough.
References and bibliography
To consult the full list of references cited in this briefing, please download the PDF version of the document.
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